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A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
OF POLITICS
BY J. V. NASH
THOMAS HEXRY HUXLEY'S political commentaries have
a special interest and significance because of the position which
Huxley occupied in the world of science. He was first of all, a
biologist. One of the most prominent exponents of the doctvine of
evolution, his life work was devoted mainly to scientific investiga-
tions in biology and related sciences.
Although his writings on government are comparatively small in
bulk, they constitute a most valuable contribution to the development
of modern political theory. He approached the subjeci: with a mind
free from inherited prejudice : his point of viev.^ was that of an im-
partial scientist. Sweeping away all fine-spun "a priori" lines of
reasoning, and pursuing to their logical result both individualism
and "regimentation," he sought to demonstrate the weaknesses inher-
ent in both these great political systems. Finally, while he did not
attempt to construct a new system to supplant those which he luider-
mined, he pointed out the way by which a better and more erduring
system could be constructed—a system based on the solid ground of
biological principles and the history of man's liocial development
through the family group, in the place of the more or less idealistic
systems based on speculative reasoning which, in attempting to real-
ize a political Utopia, inflict untold mischief upon society.
Huxley finds in the philosophy of government three fundamen-
tal problems, as follows
:
(a) In whom is the sovereign authority properly vested?
(b) By what machinery should that authority be exercised?
(c) In respect of what matters is its exercise legitimate?
The first two questions Huxley considers of subordinate impor-
tance. The one in which he is chiefly interested is the third : that
is, the relationship between the rights of the individual and the
powers of the State. This, he declares, is the great problem—so
great, indeed, that it ''com]>lclely overshadows the others." In other
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words the question is not so much who the person or persons are in
whom the government is vested, or by what methods they function,
as it is, how far the government has a right to encroach upon the
liberty of the individual. In short, he says : "The great problem
of political philosophy is to determine the province of government.
Is there, or is there not, any region of human action over which the
individual himself alone has jurisdiction and into which other men
have no business to intrude?" Today that is a question upon which
the world seems to be at sea more than at any time in the past.
Huxley begins by tracing the history of the State from the days
of Greece and Rome, showing how the authority of the government
was almost universal in scope, nothing in human life, practically,
being exempt from the intrusion of the State, save private religious
practices, the cult of the Lares and Penates. Outside the domestic
circle, indeed, even religious liberty stopped. All citizens in the
States of antiquity were required to pay homage to the State deities.
Contempt of the official gods was severely punished ; sometimes, as
in the case of Socrates, by the death penalty, though so long as the
"infider' kept quiet he was not likely to be molested.
Religion, consequently, was an integral part of government, and
a man could not be a 100 per cent (to use the current silly phrase)
citizen unless he w^ere loyal, or at least professed to be loyal, to the
national gods. Hence it was, Huxley says, that Christianity got
into trouble with the pagan State. Christianity, wnth its universality
and its ideas of human brotherhood transcending national or ethnic
boundaries, seemed to be destructive of the very existence of the
State and of the established j)olitical and economic order. He de-
clares that the Christian Church was the "International'" (or, as he
might say today if he were still living, the Third International) of
the pagan political world.
Huxley point out, too, that while Christianity is supposed to have
supplanted paganism in toto, as a matter of fact it took over manv
of the elements of the pagan State into its own organization, the
resulting product being the Mediaeval Church. In fact, he doubts
whether "the vanquished did not in effect subdue the victor."
One of the doctrines of the pagan State which Christianity took
over, according to Huxley, was the union of Church and State ; that
is. the establishment of religion, making its protection and support,
as well as the punishment of offenses against it a part of the function
of the State. So deeply intrenched did the belief become that there
was a necessary connection between the State and the Church, and
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that the authority of the State consequently extended over men's
behefs as well as over their actions, that even the Protestant reform-
ers, he says, "held firmly by this precious heirloom of the ages of
faith, whatever other shards of ecclesiastical corruption they might
cast aside."
It was the breakup of Protestantism into quarreling sects and
the consequent inability to determine just what l)eliefs were orthodox
and what were not, that finally began to weaken the doctrine of the
duty of the State to enforce religious conformity. The doctrine,
however, died hard. As late as 1611, four years after the coloniza-
tion of A'irginia. a heretic, one Bartholomew Legate, was burnt at
the stake in Protestant England, following a trial conducted by
King James in person. Professor P>ury tells the story in his History
of Freedom of Thought (1912). Under close c[uestioning. Legate
admitted that he had not prayed to Jesus for a space of some seven
years. "Away, base fellow," cried James spurning him with his
foot, "who in seven years together hath not prayed to Our Savior."
He was speedily convicted and consigned to the flames.
Speaking of the same enlightened monarch. Lecky. in his Rise
and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, says: "Soon after his
accession to the throne, a law was enacted which subjected witches
to death on the first conviction, even though they should have in-
flicted no injury upon their neighbors. This law was passed when
Coke was Attorney-General and Bacon a member of Parliament."
But to return to Huxley: it was not until 1869, he says, when
John Locke published his famous Treatise on Government, that any
"systematic inquiry" was made into the "proper limits of govern-
mental action in general."
He goes on to show the connection between Locke's epoch-mak-
ing Treatise on Government, and the Engish revolution, following
the expulsion of James H, by which Liberalism triumphed over
Absolutism. Locke based his system on the "social contract" theory.
In this he followed in the footsteps of Hobbes. In the state of nature,
as assumed by Hobbes, all men were equal and each man strove for
the enjoyment to the full of all his "natural rights," thus bringing
about a state of war of each against all. This condition proving
intolerable, Hobbes assumed in the second place that, in order to
secure the blessings of peace and order, men voluntarily entered
into a contract with each other, surrei.dering all of their "natural
rights" to the person or persons in whom sovereignty was vested.
Men having thus made a complete surrender of their "natural
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rights" to the sovereign in return for peace and protection, the
authority of the sovereign was absokite and the individual member
of the commonwealth possessed no ''natural rights" of his own at
all, having only such rights as the sovereign chose to turn back to
him. In other words, civil law, guaranteed by the whole force of
the community, superseded "natural rights" which were backed
only by the force of each individual. Huxley pictures Hobbes' ideal
of the State as "a sternly disciplined regiment, in which the citizens
are privates, the State functionaries officers, and every action in
life is regulated and settled by the sovereign's regulations and in-
structions."
Now Locke accepted the idea of a primitive "state of nature."
and the origin of government through "social contract." However,
he attacks Hobbes' theory of the total surrender of "natural rights."
According to Locke, only a very limited surrender of natural rights
took place. This difference, says Huxley, marks the divergence of
the two great systems of political philosophy which have been cur-
rent down to our own day, one line of reasoning finding its ultimate
expression in anarchy and the other in State socialism. In their less
extreme form, one is individualism and the other the system which
he describes by the word regimentation.
Huxley sketches for us the history of regimentation, which was
first preached in France by Alorelly and Mably and reached its cul-
mination in Rousseau's Essay on the Social Contract. Rousseau
laid down the proposition that the social contract is "the foundation
of all rights," that the sovereign is the totality of the citizens, and
that each individual, in assenting to the social contract, gives himself
and all he possesses to the sovereign, the individual losing all his
natural liberty and the State becoming master of him and of his
goods. In return the citizen receives from the State civil liberty
and a guarantee of his right to possession of such property as the
State may allow him to hold.
In Rousseau's State, it appears that the sovereignty itself "means
nothing more nor less than the omnipotence of a bare majority of
voices of all the members of the State collected together in general
meetings." Rousseau further assumes, as he tells us in Book II,
Chap. 3, that "the general will is always upright and always tends
towards the general good." The true end of legislation, according
to Rousseau, is the greatest good of all. and this embraces two ele-
ments, namely, liberty and equality. It appears, however, that
liberty is merely "obedience to the law which one has laid down for
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himself." Iluxlcy confesses that this definition of Hberty is a little
difficult for him to swallow. "To my mind," he says, "it is somewhat
hard to reconcile with the obligation to submit to laws laid down
by other people who happen to be in a maionty." As to equality,
Rousseau does not insist that "absolute equality of power and
wealth" must be established, but that "neither opulence nor beggary
is to be permitted," and that the legislature shall have the right to
decide the nature of the business in which the community shall
engage, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or commerce, which
means that the State shall have tlie power to control distribution
as well as production.
In Rodsseau's system, also, the sovereign people shall establish
a State religion, but this State religion is not to be based on theo-
logical dogma but on "sentiments of sociability," and heretics are
to be punished not for impiety but for "unsociability"
!
In ultimate analysis, Rousseau's system is based on the theory
of Hobbes ; i. e., the omnipotence of the State, resulting from the
complete surrender of natural rights in the social contract. Rous-
seau's political doctrines were at the bottom of the creed of Robes-
pierre and St. Just, who tried to put them into effect in the French
Revolution. "In their methods of endeavoring, by the help of the
guillotine." says Huxley, "to force men to be free, they supplied the
works naturally brought forth by the Rousseauite faith. And still
more were they obedient to the master in insisting on a State reli-
gion and in certifying the existence of God by a governmental
decree."
In fact, by going clear back to Morelly and Mably. Huxlev says
that he finds just as ably stated as by socialistic writers of the nine-
teenth century the leading doctrines of modern socialism, namely,
that all economic and political ills would be cured if the State
directed production and regulated consumption, and that "love of
approbation" would be as adequate a stimulus to industrv as the
desire for private wealth and individual power.
Huxley then traces the history of individualism. Political indi-
vidualism, as held by its more moderate supporters today, goes back
to John Locke. Although both Hobbes and Locke, as already indi-
cated, assumed a primitive "state of nature," in Hobbes' "state of
nature" men were lawless and ferocious savages while according
to Locke's theory they were "highly intelligent and respectable per-
sons." Locke represents his primitive men. in fact, as "living to-
gether according to reason, without a common superior on earth
A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICS 301
with authority to judge between them." (Civil Government, Chap.
19.) Hobbes' primitive men gave up all their natural rights because
they were not fit to retain any of them, whereas Locke's primitive
men surrendered to the State only a limited portion of their natural
rights. In fact, it was only because backsliders who failed "to main-
tain the original standard of ethical elevation that those incon-
veniences arose which drove the rest to combine into common-
wealths."
But it must be noted that it was only a very limited grant of
authority that was given- to the State. Locke, Huxley infers, had
to be very specific on this point, because with the Stuart pretender
recognized by France, and with a powerful "Divine Right" Jacobite
faction watching for a chance to restore the absolute monarchy in
England, Locke was under the necessity of insisting very strongly
upon the strictly limited character of the surrender of natural rights
by primitive man in the social contract. Therefore, he takes great
pains to prove that the power of the sovereign is limited to the
performance of functions necessary "to secure every one's prop-
erty," and similar police duties.
Huxley here introduces an amusing reference to Darwinism by
humorously imagining that Locke's primitive men, having called a
general meeting, "to consider the defects of their condition, and
somebody being voted to the tree (in the presumable absence of
chairs), this earliest example of a constituent assembly resolved
to form a governmental company, with strictly limited liability, for
the purpose of defending liberty and property."
Locke's theories were taken up enthusiastically by the Physio-
crats of the eighteenth century, because they saw in his system a
relief from the excess of government which the elder Mirabeau
described as "the worst malady of modern States," a diagnosis which
after the lapse of nearly two centuries is strikingly applicable to all
the so-called Great Powers today, and to none more so than to
the LTnited States.
It was the Physiocrats who coined the phrase, "laissez faire,"
which was merely the application of political individualism to eco-
nomics. In a nutshell, the "laissez faire" philosophy postulated the
right of every man "to do as he pleases so long as he does no harm
to others," or, in other words, "the freedom of man to do anything
he pleases so long as he does not interfere with the same freedom
in others." This rule, said Daire, in his "Phvsiocrates," is "a law
of nature." The Physiocrats professed to believe in human equality,
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but considered that the function of government was to protect lib-
erty and propert};, holding that "private property and the right to
deal freely with it are essential to the protection of the weak against
the strong." Here we have the deadlock between the individualist
and the socialist, the latter holding just as firmly to the belief that
"private property and freedom of contract involve the tyranny of
the strong over the weak."
Just as Rousseau's Social Contract is the bible of regimentation,
so Adam Smith's IVcalth of Xations. published in 1776, became the
Scripture of individualism and through it the doctrine of "laissez
faire" was given tremendous prestige. Free trade and industrial
prosperity, says Huxley, tended to strengthen individualism, and so
Liberalism came to regard laissez faire—to let alone—as "a defini-
tion of the whole duty of the statesman."
Huxley goes on to consider the treatise written by Humboldt in
1791, but not published until 1852, the purpose of which was to prove
that the "legitimate functions of the State are negative." and that
"governments have no right to take any positive steps for the pro-
motion of the welfare of the individual." Humboldt would, in
short, reduce the functions of the .State to police duties and protec-
tion against foreign enemies. He would exclude all matters of reli-
gion, morals, and even of education and the relation of the sexes
from the jurisdiction of the State.
It remained, however, for Dunoyer, in his Lihcrtc dii Travail,
the successive volumes of which were published in the years be-
tween 1825 and 1845, to set forth the most complete exposition of
individualism. In the latter year, also, appeared Stirner's The Indi-
vidual and His Property, in which the author makes a clean sweep
of everything and advocates absolutely unlimited individualism.
This says Huxley, amounts to sheer anarchy. According to Stirner,
natural right is simply natural might, certain men having entered
into society merely for self-interest, thinking they could get more
for themselves by that means; the struggle for existence is just as
bitter as ever, the only sanction to laws is the will of the majority
and the majority may be as brutal as an individual despot. As
Huxley sees it, there is practically no difference between this teach-
ing and the doctrines of avowed anarchists like Bakounine, who
maintain that whether a man shall recognize the rights of others is
a matter to be left to his private judgment, that "all property is
robbery," and that "all government from without is tyranny."
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Huxley next discusses the doctrines of Auberon Herbert and the
"party of individual liberty," which he classifies as purely anarchist
in nature, because Herbert would "do away with all enforced taxa-
tion and levying of duties, and trust to voluntary payments for
the revenue of the State." This thinker would likewise throw
overboard State education, State regulation of marriage. State sup-
ported libraries, museums, parks and the like. The functions of
the State, in Herbert's view, should be confined to "the administra-
tion of civil and criminal justice," and it is only with hesitation and
uncertainty that he grants even this amount of authority to the
State because, in his opinion, even the smallest amount of govern-
mental interference is at best only "justifiable usurpation." Huxley
ridicules the phrase "justifiable usurpation," asserting that it is a
contradiction of terms.
By these illustrations, Huxley seeks to show that "individualism,
pushed to its logical extreme, must end in philosophical anarchy,"
and quotes Donisthorpe's work entitled Individualisui, A System of
Politics (1889), in proof.
Recapitulating, we see that, from the point of view of the indi-
vidualist, the function of government is negative, its business being
"to interfere only for the purpose of preventing any one citizen from
using his liberty in such a way as to interfere with the equal liberty
of another citizen." From the point of view of the regimentalist,
on the other hand, the business of government is both negative and
"eminently positive," in that it is the function of the State "to inter-
fere for the purpose of promoting the welfare of society, . . .
however much such interference may restrict individual liberty."
And as already pointed out, individualism, pushed to its mercilessly
logical extreme, ends in anarchy, while regimentation ends in social-
ism.
Granting the premisses upon which these political theories rest,
Huxley declares that he is "unable to see that one of these lines
of argument is any better than the other ; they are mutually destruc-
tive."
The weakness of both these theories, thinks Huxley, lies in the
fallacy of their starting points, namely, "natural rights." the original
"equality of man," and "the social contract." Huxley feels so
strongly on these topics that he has written a separate essay in which
he discusses them at much length. This work is entitled Natural
and Political Rights. Here we see very clearly the influence of
Huxley the biologist upon Huxley the political philosopher. For
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instance, lie \igorously contests Rousseau's famous dictum (trans-
planted into our own Declaration of Independence) that "all men
are created equal."
"Rousseau," he says, 'Mike the sentimental rhetorician that he
was, and half, or more than half, sham, as all sentimental rhetori-
cians are, sag^aciously fouj^^ht shy, as we have seen, of the c|uestion
of the influence of natural upon political equality. 15ut those of us
who do not care for sentiment, and do care for truth, may not
evade the consideration of that which is the real key of the puzzle.
"If Rousseau, instead of letting his children go to the foundling
asylum, had taken the trouble to discharge a father's duties towards
them, he would hardly have talked so fast about men being born
equal, even in a political sense. For, if that merely means that al'
newborn children are political zeros— it is as we have seen, though
true enough, nothing to the purpose ; while, if it means that, in t^ eir
potentiality of becoming factors in any social organization—citizens
in Rousseau's sense—all men are born equal, it is probably the most
astounding falsehood that ever was put forth by a political specu-
lator, and that, as all students of political speculation will agree, is
saying a good deal for it.
"In fact, nothing is more remarkable than the wide inequality
which children, even of the same family, exhibit as soon as mental
and moral qualities begin to manifest themselves which is earlier
than most people fancy. Every family spontaneously becomes a
polity. Among the children, there are some who continue to be
'more honored and more powerful than the rest, and to make them-
selves obeyed' (sometimes, indeed, by their elders) in virtue of noth-
ing but their moral and mental qualities. Here 'political inQC|uality'
visibly dogs the heels of 'natural inequality.' The group of children
becomes a political body, a civitas. with its rights of property and
its practical distinctions of rank and power. .\nd all this comes
about neither by force nor by fraud, but as the necessary conse-
quence of the innate inequalities of capability."
Addressing his attention to the venerable doctrine of "natural
rights," Huxley is no less outspoken :
"Probably none of the political delusions which have sprung
from the 'natural rights' doctrine." he assures us, "has been more
mischievous than the assertion that all men have a natural right to
freedom, and that those who willingly submit to any restriction of
this freedom, beyond the point determined by the dictates of the
a priori philosophers, deserve the title of slaves."
This delusion, he tells us. is "the result of the error of confound-
ing natural with moral rights." He declares that there can be, in
fact, no form of association compatible with the theory of "natural
rights." because "natural rights" simply means unrestricted warfare'.
"Natural rights." furthermore, cannot be monopolized by man.
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From this point of view of nature, a ti^^er, he says, has just as
much "natural right" to kill and eat a man, in obedience to its innate
instincts, as a man has to hunt and kill the tiger.
In the same way, Huxley attacks the social contract theory. He
says: "There is just as little foundation in fact for the social con-
tract, and either the limited or the unlimited devolution of rights
and powers which is supposed to have been effected by it."
In support of his contention, he maintains that the earliest polity
was the patriarchal family, and scoffs at the idea of a "social con-
tract" entered into between the father and the wife and children,
"arising out of an expressed desire of the latter to have their liberty
and property protected by their governor." He denies that there
ever was even a "tacit understanding" on the subject, and declares
that the more primitive the group, the more improbable that any
such contract or understanding existed. In fact, there was no need
of such a contract, because the wife and children didn't possess
any liberty or property. The "pater familias" of the primitive Aryan
group was an absolute monarch, with power of life and death over
the members of the family, and the primitive State, if such there
might have been, was probably a sort of federation of these little
family monarchies, "the chief purpose of which was the maintenance
of an established church for the worship of the familv ancestors."
"Archaic society," he points out, "aims not at the freest possible
exercise of rights, but at the exactest possible discharge of duties,"
and among these duties, in such a group the propitiation of the ances-
tral gods was by far the most impo^-tant.
Although Huxley thus, as he admits, throws "out of court" both
of these political theories, because they are "built upon the quick-
sand of fictitious history," he is extremely dissatisfied with the pres-
ent state of society. He says :
"Even the best of modern civilization appears to me to exhibit
a condition of mankind which neither embodies any worthy ideal
nor even possesses the merit of stability. I do not hesitate to express
the opinion that, if there is no hope of a large im.provement of the
condition of the greater part of the human family; if it is true that
the increase of knowledge, the winning of greater dominion over
nature which is its consequence, and the wealth which follows upon
that dominion, are to make no difference in the extent and the in-
tensity of Want, with its concomitant physical and moral degrada-
tion, among the masses of the people, I should hail the advent of
some kindly comet, which would sweep the whole affair away, as
a desirable consummation.
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"What profits it to the human Prometheus that he has stolen the
fire of heaven to be his servant, and that the spirits of the earth
and of the air obey him, if the vulture of pauperism is eternally to
tear his very vitals and keep him on the brink of destruction?"
What i)rofits it indeed? It is a question that is being repeated
with greater and greater insistence everywhere today.
Huxley now proceeds to draw an analogy from the government
of the family group, and shows how too strict rule and no rule at
all in the family are alike destructive in their effects. Coming, then,
to "the aggregation of families which constitutes the State," he finds
that the same rule substantially applies. The problem of govern-
ment, he says, is "what ought to be done and xyhat be left undone
by society, as a whole, in order to bring about as much welfare of
its members as is compatible with the natural order of things."
Now, he goes on to argue, the fact must be faced, that the nat-
ural order tends to inequality ; that is, "to the maintenance, in one
shape or another, of the war of each against all." Here we see the
influence of "the struggle for existence" in Huxley's political rea-
soning. We see also that the Malthusian law is present in his mind,
for he says : "The pressure of a constant increase of population upon
the means of support must keep up the struggle for existence, what-
ever form of social organization may be adopted." This alone, he
believes, would soon bring to a crisis any system of society based
either upon laissez faire individualism or upon State socialism.
After all—and here it is Huxley the Biologist speaking the final
word—"the political problem of problems is how to deal with over-
population." He traces over-population to two sources—internal by
generation and external by immigration. Theoretically, he believes,
want and misery could be eliminated by arresting over-population
at both sources and keeping the mainifacturing, commercial, and
professional population down to a prescribed minimum, so that the
production of society will be adequate to the reasonable wants of
the po])ulation. This is the plan advocated by k'ichte in The Closed
Inditstria! State, and Huxley confesses that he knows of no other
social ^arrangement likely to bring about this result. In anv event,
he warns political speculators who, like Rousseau, indulge in visions
of a "millenium of equality and fraternity." that they must not lose
sight of the biological factors, for. by so doing, they are "reckon-
ing sadly without their host or rather hostess. Dame Nature."
